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Abstract 
 
 
 
The literature on unemployment dynamics is mainly concerned with the nature and 
impact of shocks to unemployment. In this paper we use OECD unemployment data 
to infer the nature of these shocks using factor analysis. We find that two Principal 
Components can account for a large part of the variance of unemployment between 
and within countries. We then use regression analysis in which equilibrium 
unemployment depends on a global shock and domestic labour market institutions, 
and the institutions also determine the response to global shocks and the speed of 
convergence to equilibrium. We find that national unemployment series do converge 
to a moving equilibrium and that the responsiveness shocks and the speed of 
convergence to equilibrium also change over time as domestic labour market 
institutions change. The calculation of the Principal Components is suggestive of the 
possible economic causes of long swings in unemployment. 
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When observing unemployment over long periods of time it becomes apparent that its 
long swings – or decade-to-decade changes – dominate shorter business cycles. In 
most countries, the 1930s were a period of high unemployment, the fifties and sixties 
a period of low unemployment and the seventies and eighties a period of rising 
unemployment, while the verdict on the nineties is more mixed – the unemployment 
experiences diverge. Although many macroeconomists are still primarily concerned 
with monetary factors, there is a growing literature on the causes of such long swings 
in economic activity.1 This was initially prompted by the persistent elevation of 
unemployment in most OECD countries in the seventies and eighties, the US and 
Scandinavia being the prime exceptions from this pattern. However, while the 
theoretical literature has expanded rapidly, the empirical literature has been less 
successful at discriminating between the competing theories. This is to some extent 
due to an unfortunate combination of complex models and limited data. 
 It is the objective of this paper to take a fresh look at the data in order to narrow 
down the set of plausible models and hypotheses. Instead of starting out with a set of 
theories to be tested – which is the approach most commonly adopted in this literature 
– we will be looking at the unemployment data in an attempt to identify empirical 
regularities. Two issues are of particular interest: First, what is the relative 
contribution of global factors (such as changes in oil prices and world interest rates), 
and domestic factors (such as labour market institutions)? In particular, what are the 
characteristics of shocks that have affected unemployment in the OECD in the last 
forty years or so? Second, can the observed persistence of national unemployment 
series be explained by a slow response of unemployment to transitory shocks or are 
the shocks themselves persistent? If the shocks themselves are persistent, labour 
markets may function well in the sense that employment returns to a moving 
equilibrium following demand shocks.  
 
1. Theoretical issues 
 
There are theories of unemployment that emphasise flows and there are others that 
emphasise stocks. There are theories that explain persistence – sometimes called 
                                                 
1 See, amongst other contributions, Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Phelps (1994), Blanchard 
(2000), Pissarides (2000). 
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hysteresis2 – and others that explain changes in the underlying equilibrium. The 
reduced-form equation (1) can help clarify the distinction between some of the 
competing theories. Suppose for country i the rate of unemployment is u and the 
natural rate of unemployment is u*. We can then write an equation for the 
(expectations-augmented) Phillips curve as 
( )ititieitit uu -+= *hpp ,                                            (1) 
where hi denotes the (country-specific) responsiveness of inflation to cyclical 
unemployment and u* is the time-varying natural rate of unemployment.3 Assume 
1-= it
e
it pp , which would be a rational expectation if inflation was a random walk, but 
could be justified on other assumptions. We now have ( )ititiit uu -=D *hp ,4 which is 
the standard textbook expectations-augmented Phillips curve; when unemployment is 
below (above) its natural rate, the rate of inflation is rising (falling).  
Rewriting gives equation (1’) where g =1/h measures the effect of surprise 
inflation on unemployment: 
itiitit uu pg D-=
*                                                 (1’)  
Viewed in this light, the equation tells us that surprise inflation can bring 
unemployment below its natural rate. Such short-run non-neutrality of inflation has 
been explained by appealing to information imperfections – the equation then 
becomes a Lucas supply function (Friedman, 1968; Lucas 1972) – time-dependent 
price-setting rules (Taylor, 1980) and menu costs (Mankiw, 1985; Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki, 1987). 
Empirically, deviations of unemployment from its natural rate are serially 
correlated due to the costs of hiring and firing, amongst other factors. To capture this 
                                                 
2 The concept of hysteresis has been a source of considerable confusion. Some authors take it to mean a 
unit root in the unemployment series; others define it in terms of the coefficient of lagged 
unemployment in an AR(1) process; yet others follow Phelps (1972) in defining hysteresis as implying 
that a temporary disequilibrium affects the position of the equilibrium point or at least creates some 
friction on the way back to equilibrium; and finally there is the definition of the term in physics which 
has been applied to the theory of unemployment by Bruno Amable, Jérome Henry, Frédéric Lordon 
and Richard Topol (1993), and to international trade by Richard Baldwin (1988).  
3 Equation (1) describes the “cost-push” view of inflation. See Samuelson and Solow (1960). 
4 This equation can be used to estimate the natural rate of unemployment by first assuming 
(incorrectly) that it is a constant, and estimating the equation (by substituting a constant term for u*) 
and then using the estimate of h to calculate the natural rate:  
( ) ttutu ph D+= ˆ1*ˆ  
For is sues involving the calculation of the standard errors of the estimate see Staiger, Stock and Watson 
(1997). 
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phenomenon we can rewrite the equation as 
( ) itiitiitiit uuu pgll D--+= -1* 1 .                                    (2) 
We will write this as a partial adjustment model, where we explicitly take into 
account the dependency of the natural rate on in its (real) domestic, D, and global, G, 
determinants.5 and allow for some persistence in the change in unemployment: 
( )* , , 1 , 1,  it i it it i t i t i i t i itu u D G u ul d g p- -é ùD = - + D - Dë û                         (3) 
There is a long-run relationship between unemployment and its moving natural rate 
u*, and if the speed of convergence l>0, then following demand shocks (Dp) that 
move it away from the natural rate, it will gradually converge back to equilibrium. 
The parameter l is often taken to measure the flexibility of the labour market in a 
given country, l close to zero then implies hysteresis – the absence of any 
convergence to the natural rate – and the natural rate is no longer an attractor. When l  
approaches one the difference between the actual and the natural unemployment rate – 
that is the cyclical unemployment rate – becomes serially uncorrelated white noise. 
 The value of l is important because it reflects the labour market’s tendency to 
converge to some equilibrium in the long run. It symbolises the modern analogue to 
the “Keynes versus the Classics debate” on the tendency of economies to revert to full 
employment if left on their own. The main difference between that debate and the 
current one is that equilibrium now entails (involuntary) unemployment. However, as 
before, if the tendency is absent – l is equal to 0 – active demand management is of 
paramount importance. If, in contrast, l is much greater than zero, the labour market 
can be relied upon to converge to its equilibrium; unemployment converges to the 
natural rate of unemployment.  
 Conceptually, there are two approaches to explaining the long swings – or decade-
to-decade changes – in unemployment. There is the hysteresis approach according to 
which the coefficient l has a value close to zero. Here, transitory shocks to 
unemployment – caused by monetary factors Dp  or transitory changes in the elements 
of the vectors D and G – have a persistent, even permanent, effect on the 
unemployment rate. These theories include the insider-outsider model of Blanchard 
                                                 
5 The reduced form u*(D,G) corresponds to a structural form where the natural rate is determined by 
the intersection of a downward-sloping labour demand curve (sometimes called a price-setting curve) 
and an upward-sloping wage curve (or wage-setting curve). The microeconomic foundations for the 
wage curve can be found in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), to take one example. 
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and Summers (1986) and Lindbeck and Snower (1988), as well as the human-capital 
channels emphasised by Layard et al. (1991). Alternatively, one can postulate a 
moving natural rate. Here, autonomous (unobservable) changes in u* – caused by 
changes in the elements of the vectors D and G – exert an effect on observed 
unemployment. An increase of u* will then exert a gradual upward effect on actual 
unemployment. How fast this happens depends on the coefficient l – a rigid labour 
market is likely to see a longer, more gradual response. Contributions in this vein 
include Pissarides (2000) – who follows the flow approach embodied in the so-called 
matching function – and Phelps (1994) – who follows a stock approach. We will refer 
to the moving-equilibrium approach as the “structural approach”. This implies that 
long swings in unemployment are not due to the effect of monetary factors but rooted 
in real variables, the structure of the economy. 
 There is a large literature that attempts to estimate the correct value of l. This is a 
difficult task because the results depend on how we measure u*:6 We can assume that 
u* is a constant, but in this case it is almost always never possible to reject the 
hypothesis that l=0; alternatively, one can use statistical filters – such as the Hodrick-
Prescott filter7 – to deduce the path of the natural rate from the observed actual 
unemployment path, but different filters give different results for l; or one can let u* 
be a function of some other variables taken from economic theory, e.g. price mark-
ups, the rate of productivity growth, real interest rates, energy prices etc., but different 
choices of these variables give different results. 
 With every passing year of high unemployment in Europe fresh doubts are cast on 
the hysteresis approach. While models in that tradition can plausibly be expected to 
explain persistently high unemployment over a few years, it is less likely that they can 
explain unemployment epochs that last many decades. When generations retire from 
the labour market, they bring with them any impaired human capital, disillusion with 
job prospects and other malaise formed during long unemployment spells. Similarly, 
differences between “insiders” and “outsiders” must fade as both parties move into 
retirement homes! 
 Stephen Nickell and Olivier Blanchard have, amongst many others, made recent 
                                                 
6 See, amongst many other contributions, Karanassou and Snower (1998) and Henry, Karanassou and 
Snower (2000). 
7 The Hodrick-Prescott filter, in essence, minimises the sum of squared deviations between trend and 
actual observations with a penalty for curvature. 
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contributions to the structural approach. Nickell (1998, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004) puts 
the emphasis on the institutional elements of the vector D above, in particular 
variables measuring labour-market institutions. Nickell and his co-authors have 
constructed summary indices of important features of the labour market for most of 
the OECD countries, such as the level and duration of unemployment benefits, the 
density, coverage and centralisation of labour unions, employment-protection 
legislation, spending on active labour-market programmes, and labour taxation. It is 
his contention, supported by empirical evidence, that variation in these institutional 
variables help explain differences across countries for a given time period as well as 
differences over time for any given country. Nickell and Ours (2000) explain changes 
in equilibrium unemployment in the UK and the Netherlands by changes in labour 
market institutions. They argue that the main difference between the two countries is 
that while Dutch unions were already co-operative, British unions were made to co-
operate by government actions. In both countries, financial incentives for work for 
unemployed workers collecting benefits were increased. 
 Blanchard (see Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000), in contrast, emphasises the 
interaction of shocks and institutions. Here he follows in the footsteps of Krugman 
(1994), chapter 17 in Phelps (1994) and Layard et al. (1991): Institutions are 
important not because of the direct impact they exert on unemployment, but because 
they determine how sensitive unemployment is to certain macroeconomic shocks.8  
 Numerous real macroeconomic shocks affecting u* have been discussed in the 
literature. Changes in (world) real interest rates affect the hiring and training of 
workers – higher interest rate imply a higher level of the natural rate of 
unemployment (Phelps, 1994); lower expected productivity growth also reduces 
training investment and causes higher unemployment (Pissarides, 2000; Hoon and 
Phelps, 1997); alternatively, a fall in productivity growth rates only gradually affects 
workers’ wage aspirations, hence unit labour costs and unemployment go up (Ball and 
Moffit, 2001; Ball and Mankiw, 2002); higher oil prices reduce labour demand 
causing higher unemployment (Bruno and Sachs, 1985; see also Carruth, Hooker and 
Oswald, 1998); higher stock prices imply expectations of increased future profits and 
a higher implicit shadow price of trained workers, which brings increased training and 
                                                 
8 In contrast, a recent paper by Phelps (2002) has a discussion of the role of institutions in the genesis 
of shocks, especially productivity shocks, current and anticipated, which then can have an effect on 
unemployment.  
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employment (Phelps and Zoega, 2001); higher start-up costs reduce firm creation and 
employment (Pissarides, 2002); shop closing laws can suppress service employment 
(Burda, 2000) and, finally, higher real exchange rates (appreciated) may make mark-
ups of price of marginal cost fall which raises labour demand (the real product wage) 
and employment (Hoon, Phelps and Zoega, 2004).9 Meanwhile, the erstwhile 
proponents of hysteresis have become increasingly silent. Instead of postulating that 
labour-market institutions may cause hysteresis – as in Layard et al. (1991) – what is 
currently under debate is whether these institutions exert a direct effect on the natural 
rate of unemployment or whether they interact with macroeconomic shocks in its 
determination. 
 
2. Preliminaries 
We start by measuring unemployment persistence by testing for a unit root in 
unemployment. We then look for explanations for the observed persistence and begin 
with labour market institutions. First we consider the direct relationship between 
unemployment and institutions and thereafter the interdependencies between shocks 
and institutions.  
 
2.1 Unemployment persistence  
Let us return to equation (3). Notice if the natural rate is a country specific constant, 
**
iit uu = , the equation – with an error term e added – reduces to the standard ADF 
equation augmented by an inflation surprise term 
ititiitiitiiit uuu epgdla +D-D+-=D -- 11                              (4) 
where *iii ula =  and the hypothesis of interest is that 0il =  implying no adjustment. 
Again, if 0il =  there is said to be complete hysteresis, there is no equilibrium rate of 
unemployment that acts as an attractor for actual unemployment. If li > 0, in contrast, 
there is mean reversion and the coefficient can be used as a measure of the flexibility 
of the labour market, that is how rapidly the market returns to equilibrium. Table 1 
                                                 
9 Our list is by no means exclusive: Changes in the age and educational composition of the labour force 
affect the natural rate of unemployment. For a discussion of the former in the US context, see Shimer 
(1998) while for the importance of educational composition see Francesconi, Orszag, Phelps and Zoega 
(2000). There is also the apparent empirical relationship between unemployment and home ownership 
(see Oswald, 1997; and a contrasting view by Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004). Katz and Krueger 
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below shows the results of an ADF test for 21 countries, which form our core sample 
of countries in this paper.  
 
Australia  -1,91 Germany -0,77 New Zealand -2,06 
Austria  -1,04 Greece -1,34 Norway -1,82 
Belgium -2,00 Iceland -1,99 Portugal -2,96 
Canada -1,97 Ireland -1,44 Spain -2,11 
Denmark -1,76 Italy -2,24 Sweden -2,10 
Finland -2,47 Japan 1,27 U.K. -2,24 
France -1,56 Netherlands -2,59 U.S. -3,20 
 
Table 1. ADF tests on unemployment rates, 1960-2003. Rejection of unit root at 1% level if ADF 
< -4.20; at the 5% level if ADF < -3.52; and at the 10% level for ADF < -3.19. 
 
We fail to reject the existence of a unit root at the 1% and the 5% confidence level for 
all countries. We can, however, reject at the 10% confidence level for the United 
States only. For the sake of comparison, the average world unemployment series has 
an ADF statistic of -1.581, so the unit-root effect could be coming from very 
persistent global shocks. 
There is a large literature on why it may be difficult to reject the hypothesis l=0 
when there is in fact adjustment to equilibrium in the data, that is the true value of l is 
greater than zero: these include the low power of the tests10; the sensitivity to the span 
of the data – over a century of data unemployment looks I(0) over half a century 
perhaps I(1);11 there may be mean shifts (Perron, 1989); there may be non-linear 
adjustment with unemployment looking like a random walk within a range of the 
equilibrium but adjusting back into the range fairly quickly.  
It so happens that one of the stylised facts of unemployment is that shifts in its 
mean rate between decades and half-decades account for most of its variance. Bianchi 
and Zoega (1998) use a statistical analysis based on Markov switching regression 
                                                                                                                                            
(1999) focus on the impact of increased rates of incarceration as well as temporary jobs in the US, and 
Autor and Duggan (2001) discuss the role of increased stringency of disability insurance.  
10 Panel unit-root tests may have more power, but they require the unit-root tests for the different 
countries to be independent. This is unlikely since the e are almost certainly correlated because of 
global shocks that influence all countries. See Papell, Murray and Ghiblawi (2000). 
11 Bianchi and Zoega (1997) look at historical unemployment data for France, the UK and the US and 
find that the unemployment series can be described as stationary around an infrequently changing 
mean. Moreover, the speed of convergence towards mean unemployment is slower when 
unemployment is high and differs across the three countries: the two European countries having more 
persistence. A more recent paper by Tim Hatton (2002) draws on a recently developed, historically-
consistent, time series for the UK from 1871 to 1999 and finds that trends in labour productivity do 
matter but only go part of the way towards explaining wide swings in average unemployment across 
the decades. 
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models to identify the dates of infrequent changes in the mean of the unemployment 
rate series of fifteen OECD countries between 1970 and 1996. We find that for most 
countries, unemployment persistence is much reduced once the (infrequently) 
changing mean rate has been removed. Papell, Murray and Ghiblawi (2000) get 
similar results using panel data.12 This implies that while the effect of some shocks to 
unemployment persists, the effect of other shocks does not. When one then extends 
the sample to cover much longer periods these mean shifts become visibly transient 
and unit root tests reject more frequently over such long periods. We next turn to the 
possible causes of these shifts in the mean rate of unemployment and start by 
reviewing some of the existing work in this area. 
 
2.2 Institutions  
One-way of simplifying equation (3) is to average the data over many years and 
assume that u=u*. In this case the estimated equation becomes 
( ) ittitiitit GDuu e+= ,,*   , .                                               (3’)                                         
Let us begin by focusing exclusively on institutions, omitting G from equation (3’) 
and letting D only include institutional variables.13 Following Nickell (1999, 2003) 
and using his data,14 we define six periods: 1960-1964, 1965-1972, 1973-1979, 1980-
1987, 1988-1995 and 1996-1999 and estimate a panel where unemployment is a 
function of different labour-market institutions: the unemployment benefit 
replacement ratio, the maximum allowed duration of benefits, union density, union 
coverage, the coordination of unions and employers, employment protection 
legislation, 15 taxes on labour and active labour market expenditures. We have six 
observations for each of the seven institutions for each country. This allows us to 
                                                 
12 A related paper by Coakley, Fuertes and Zoega (2001) assesses the hysteresis and structuralist 
theories of unemployment in the light of the post-1960 experiences of the US, UK and Germany. 
Structural breaks are detected for the UK and Germany in 1980 and for the US in 1973, indicating a 
sharp one-time increase in their respective natural rates. Bootstrap symmetry tests provide evidence of 
dynamic asymmetries for all series with rapid mean reversion following booms and persistence in the 
wake of recessions. 
13 For a critical assessment of the cross-country evidence see Baker, Glyn, Howell and Schmitt (2004). 
14 The data on labour market institutions is taken from his 2003 paper in the DICE Report, Journal for 
Institutional Comparisons. 
15 There is limited consensus on the effect of employment protection legislation on unemployment. 
While Layard and Nickell (1999) find no such effect, Lazear (1990) found a significant positive effect, 
as did Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) using the OECD summary index of formal employment 
protection. However, Addison and Grosso (1996) find no significant evidence when using data similar 
to those used by Lazear. Moreover, in an earlier paper, Blanchard and Jimeno (1995) point out that the 
degree of enforcement of employment protection differs significantly between Spain and Portugal 
despite similar summary indicators of the strictness of the legislation.  
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explain differences in unemployment over both time and space. Equation (3’) now 
takes the form of equation (5) below: 
( ) itttititit dDuu et ++= *                                              (5) 
where D is a vector of the seven institutional variables for 20 OECD countries.16 In 
addition to the six institutional variables, we add dt, which is a time dummy for year t. 
The product t*d then measures global shocks where tt is a coefficient that is restricted 
to take the same value for all countries for period t. The results are reported in the 
table below. 
 
Explanatory variables 1960-1999  1980-1999  
Replacement ratio    8.18*  (1.70) 
11.11* 
(3.03) 
Duration of benefits -1.46  (0.99) 
         -0.84 
(2.07) 
Density -0.02  (0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Coverage  0.01  (0.02) 
  0 .07* 
(0.03) 
Coordination  -2.18* (0.57) 
-5.47* 
(1.37) 
Employment protection 0.50 (0.66) 
 3.95* 
(1.77) 
Taxes on labour 0.03 (0.04) 
         -0.08 
(0.06) 
Labour market expenditures         -10.19* (3.05) 
 
Table 2. Unemployment and labour market institutions. Standard errors in parentheses. Weighted 
–least-squares estimation. The star denotes statistically significant coefficients at the 5% level. The 
replacement ratio is measured in the first year of an unemployment spell and averaged over three 
family types. Duration is a function of the replacement ratio in the first five years of an unemployment 
spell. Density is the percentage employed workers that belong to a union. Coverage measures the 
percentage of employees affected by collective bargaining. Coordination is an index that measures the 
extent to which unions and employers take the national employment implications into account when 
bargaining over wages. Employment protection is also an index, the higher the number the greater is 
the protection. Taxes (%) include payroll taxes, income taxes and consumption taxes. Labour market 
expenditures measure active labour market policies. See Nickell (2003). 
 
In the first set of results the labour market expenditures variable is omitted but all 
periods included. In this case, unemployment is a statistically significant and positive 
function of the unemployment benefit replacement ratio and a negative and significant 
function of coordination. Other coefficients are insignificantly different from zero. 
                                                 
16 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin land, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the U.S. 
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The only surprise here is the duration of benefits, which unexpectedly has a negative 
sign. This is presumably caused by the inclusion of the Scandinavian countries (low 
unemployment, fairly long duration). In the second set of results we add a variable 
measuring (active) labour market expenditures for the period 1980-1999, which was 
not included before because of lack of data for the period 1960-1979. In addition to 
the significant effect of the unemployment benefit replacement ratio and union and 
employer coordination, we now find that higher union coverage raises unemployment 
and labour market expenditures lower it.  
Figure 1 has the time effects t* d for the whole period. This variable rises from a 
rate around 3% in the late sixties to over 4% in the late seventies to 7% in the eighties 
and then falls to between 5% and 6% in the nineties. These very significant 
differences between periods suggest that changes in institutions do not adequately 
account for national developments. Clearly, the steep rise in unemployment in the 
seventies and at the beginning of the eighties is not captured by the institutional 
variables in the equation. 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
% 
6 0 - 6 4          6 5 - 7 2         7 3 - 7 9            8 0 - 8 7           8 8 - 9 5            9 6 - 9 9 
 
Figure 1. Global shocks not explained by institutional changes (t*d). 
 
In contrast, a significant fraction of the variation across countries for each time period 
is captured by differences in labour-market institutions as seen in the table below.  
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Period R-squared  (60-99) 
R-squared  
(80-99) 
Mean 
unemployment 
1960-64 0.11 –  3.4 
1965-72 0.45 – 2.8 
1973-79 0.81 – 4.2 
1980-87 0.47 0.71 7.8 
1988-95 0.17 0.58 7.5 
1996-99 0.11 0.32 7.6 
 
Table 3. Institutions and differences in unemployment across countries. The second column 
corresponds to column (2) in Table 2 and the third one to column (3). In each case the panel was 
estimated as a system of equations – one equation for each time period – and this gave one R2 for 
each period. 
 
Interestingly, the equation appears to explain the cross-country differences better in 
the seventies and eighties than in the sixties and nineties. The seventies and the 
eighties were the decades when supply shocks rocked the OECD economies. It seems 
that the effects of the institutional differences only kicked in during these large shocks 
but were of little importance during periods of less turmoil. This leads us to believe 
that it is not the institutions themselves that are of importance but their interaction 
with economic shocks. It is this interaction to which we turn. 
 
2.3 Shocks and institutions  
Following Zoega (1993), Phelps (1994) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) we next 
estimate an equation where ( )ttiiit du tba +=* , dt is again a time dummy for period t  
– so the product t*d measures global shocks where tt is again a coefficient that is 
restricted to take the same value for all countries for period t – ai is a country-specific 
fixed effect and b i measures the sensitivity of national unemployment to global 
shocks: 
( ) itttiiit du etba ++=                                               (6) 
Once we have the estimates of b i, we can relate these to the institutions of the labour 
market; ibˆ  = B(Di).  
Using the same periods as above we find that the equation does a good job at 
explaining the variation in unemployment over time, as well as between countries. 
The figure below shows the evolution of the global shocks t*d over the period.  
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Figure 2. Global shocks to unemployment (t*d) 
 
Note the steep rise in the late seventies, early eighties and the partial recovery in 
recent years. The variable is currently 4% higher than in the late 1960 and the only 
around 2% below its maximum in the eighties. The estimated coefficients follow in 
the table below. Note the large variation in the sensitivity to global shocks ranging 
from b=0.12 in the US to b=2.95 for Spain. 
 
 Country Constant term a Sensitivity b Country Constant term a Sensitivity b 
 Australia  2.53 (0.28) 1   Japan 
1.57 
(0.59) 
0.33 
(0.15) 
 Austria  1.38 (0.29) 
0.43 
(0.08)   Netherl. 
1.81 
(1.22) 
0.87 
(0.31) 
 Belgium 2.91 (0.72) 
1.17 
(0.19)   Norway 
1.75 
(0.46) 
0.39 
(0.12) 
 Canada 5.30 (0.38) 
0.68 
(0.10)   New  Z. 
-0.02 
(0.63) 
1.16 
(0.15) 
 Denmark 2.20 (0.55) 
0.79 
(0.14)   Portugal 
3.04 
(0.70) 
0.56 
(0,18) 
 Finland 2.11 (1.23) 
1.35 
(0.32)   Spain 
2.17 
(0.52) 
2.95 
(0.21) 
 France 2.11 (1.29) 
1.53 
(0.16)   Sweden 
1.19 
(1.06) 
0.81 
(0.27) 
 Germany 3.92 (1.29) 
0.43 
(0.32)   Switzerl. 
0.15 
(0.32) 
0.49 
(0.09) 
 Ireland 4.91 (1.67) 
1.13 
(0.42)   UK 
3.01 
(0.78) 
0.95 
(0.20) 
 Italy 3.83 (0.62) 
0.84 
(0.16)   US 
5.21 
(0.65) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
 
Table 4. Parameter estimates from equation (3). Standard errors in parentheses. Weighted-least- 
  squares estimation. Unemployment measured in percentages. The b for Australia is given a  
  value 1. 
 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
% 
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The cross-country differences in the sensitivity to global shocks bˆ  can be explained 
by the average value of the national labour-market institutions. The results are in 
Table 4 below. 17 
 
Constant term 0.07 (0.40) Union coverage 
  0.01* 
(0.004) 
Replacement ratio  2.31* (1.04) Coordination 
         -0.66 
(0.37) 
Duration of benefits 0.43 (0.36) 
Employment 
protection 
  0.77* 
(0.34) 
Union density 0.00 (0.02) 
Labour market 
expenditures 
-0.27 
(0.43) 
Observations 19 R-squared 0.54 
 
     Table 5.  Sensitivity to global shocks and institutions. Standard errors in parentheses. A star  
  indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.  Ireland is not included because  
  of missing data on union coverage. 
 
 
As expected, the sensitivity of global shocks is a positive function of the replacement 
ratio, the duration of unemployment benefits, union coverage and employment 
protection. It is a negative function of the degree of coordination. Both union density 
and labour market expenditures have a statistically insignificant coefficient.  
The interaction of shocks and institutions can explain both the variation across 
countries for a given year as well as changes over time. However, this treatment has 
several limitations. 
 
3. Shocks identified 
The preliminary investigation in Section 2 has two important weaknesses. First, the 
time-varying effects mask a mixture of national and global effects. The  statistical 
significance of the parameter t does not establish the finding that there are important 
global developments affecting each country’s natural rate of unemployment. Equally 
likely, it might only reflect the average value of a set of idiosyncratic factors. So the 
question about the nature of the shocks to unemployment remains. This was the first 
question posed at the beginning of this paper. 
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Second, we have ignored the distinction between structural – that is a moving 
natural rate – and hysteresis approaches to unemployment. We did not attempt to 
distinguish between transitory shocks having a persistent effect on unemployment, on 
the one hand, and persistent shocks to the natural rate of unemployment. This was the 
other important issue discussed in Section 1, i.e. whether labour markets have a 
tendency to converge to some equilibrium over time.  
 
3.1 Shocks 
Clearly there are some underlying unobserved variables that are influencing the 
pattern of unemployment. Instead of using time dummies as a proxy or taking these 
from theory as described in Section I above, we will calculate the underlying shocks 
from the 42*21 matrix (T*N) U of unemployment data for twenty-one countries (our 
core sample listed in Table 1 above) and forty-two years using the method of 
Principal Components. This method offers an ideal way of extracting a measure of the 
unobserved natural rate of unemployment – or its determinants – from the data. In 
other words, Principal-Components analysis offers an ideal way of deriving a set of 
(independent) shocks that may account for a large fraction of the variation in the data.  
 Consider the partial adjustment model, which is a simplified version of equation 
(3): 
( ) ititiititiit uuuu edl +D+-=D -- 11*                                  (7) 
where the natural rate depends on vectors of domestic D and global G factors: 
* * ' 'it i i it i tu u D Gq f= + +                                            (8) 
The equation can be written in terms of the current values of the global and domestic 
factors: 
'it i t itu G eg= +                                                     (9) 
'' iii flg =                                                        (10) 
( ) ( ) ititiitiitiiiit uuDue edlql +D+-++= -- 11* 1'                     (11) 
and the current values of the global factors G can be estimated as the Principal 
Components of the uit.18  
                                                                                                                                            
17 We omit labour taxation this time since there is no a-priori reason for this variable to affect the 
sensitivity of unemp loyment to shocks. 
18 These may also capture some of the effect of past values of the global factors, which influence uit-1 
and Duit-1.  
 16 
We calculate the Principal Components of the contemporaneous covariance 
matrix.19 We first take the standardised U matrix and construct its variance-covariance 
(correlation) matrix U’U and diagonalise the matrix in the following way:  
' 'A U UA= F                                                     (12) 
where A is the matrix of orthogonal eigenvectors and F is the (21*21) diagonal matrix 
of eigenvalues. We can then define Z = UA to be the 42*21 matrix of Principal 
Components (PCs) where each column of matrix Z is a 42*1 vector of observations 
for one principal component. Each eigenvalue gives the proportion of the total 
variance of matrix U explained by the relevant PC. Table 5 gives the four largest 
eigenvalues, together with the percentage of the variance and the cumulative 
percentage of the variance of matrix U explained by the first four Principal 
Components.  
 
Shocks Eigenvalues 
Percentage of 
variance 
explained 
Cumulative 
percentage 
explained 
 Z1: Continental shocks       14.16 69% 69% 
 Z2: American shocks  3.15  15% 84% 
 Z3: Late-eighties shocks  0.98 5% 89% 
 Z4: Scandinavian shocks  0.74 4% 93% 
        
          Table 5.  Principal Components for OECD unemployment 
 
The first principal component Z1 is shown in Figure 3 below and the 
corresponding eigenvector can be found in Table 6. The factor loadings are similar for 
all the countries except for the United States, which gets a much lower value. The 
following countries have somewhat higher loadings than the rest: Australia, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Since five of these six countries are on the 
                                                 
19 Of course the factors and the errors may have a dynamic structure. A dynamic factor analysis takes 
the Principal Components of the spectral density matrix. Dynamic factor analysis is appropriate if the 
variables include leading, coincident and lagged indicators of the unobserved factor, e.g. the business 
cycle, as in Kose et al. (2003); or if one is primarily interested in forecasting. We are interested in the 
adjustment of the various unemployment rates to the unobserved world factors, therefore extracting the 
static factors and measuring the adjustment to them is more relevant than having the dynamics 
absorbed in the factors. We are interested in estimating   
( ) s sA L y f et t t= +  
while the dynamic factor model has the time-series representation 
( ) dtedtfLBty += , 
where A(L)  and B(L)  are polynomials in the lag operator.   
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European Continent we label this first PC the “Continental shocks”. The shock 
explains a very high percentage of the total variation in the unemployment matrix U  
(69%). This variable has very low values until 1975, then an increase in mean value 
and again an increase after 1980. The late eighties have a partial recovery and then a 
rapid but transient elevation in the early nineties.  
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     Figure 3. The Continental shocks 
 
 The Continental shock variable captures the economic turmoil following the two 
oil price hikes in the seventies (1973 and 1979); the recession that hit much of Europe 
in the early eighties; and the recession that followed German unification and the 
accompanying high interest rates and exchange rate problems in the early nineties. In 
contrast to the elevation of unemployment in the seventies and the eighties, the 
elevation in the nineties turned out to be only transient since the Continent al shocks 
variable had the same value in year 2000 as it had in year 1990.20 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Interestingly, the elements of this first eigenvector are well explained by the institutional variables in 
Section 2. If we estimate an equation with the eigenvector as a dependent variable and the institutions 
of Table 4 above (average values) as regressors, we find that the unemployment benefit replacement 
ratio has a positive coefficient (0.1 (t=0.9)), the same applies to duration (0.1 (t=2.8), labour taxes 
(0.002 (2.5)) and employment protection (0.06 (t=1.8)) while coordination and labour market 
expenditure have negative coefficients (-0.03 (t=1.0) and –0.03 (t=1.2) respectively). Union density 
and coverage have statistically insignificant coefficients. 
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Country Z1 Country Z1 Country Z1 
Australia  0.2520 Germany 0.2471 Norway 0.2385 
Austria  0.2351 Greece 0.1928 New Zeal. 0.2180 
Belgium 0.2462 Iceland 0.1906 Portugal 0.1541 
Canada 0.2279 Ireland 0.1830 Spain 0.2557 
Denmark 0.2340 Italy 0.2440 Sweden 0.1989 
Finland 0.2191 Japan 0.1802 UK 0.2340 
France 0.2575 Netherlands 0.2112 US 0.0846 
 
Table 6. Eigenvector for first principal component; the “Continental shocks”. 
 
We now turn to the second principal component Z2, shown in Figure 4. This 
second PC explains around 15% of the total variation in the unemployment matrix 
and together the first two PCs explain 84% of the variation in the data. Since PCs are 
orthogonal, if Z1 has all positive weights, the second PC, the Z2, must have a mixture 
of negative and positive weights. It turns out that Z2 has a large weight for the US and 
a strong resemblance to the US unemployment plot. Other countries with large 
positive weights are: Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. All 
five countries experienced falling unemployment in the 1990s. 
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    Figure 4. The American shocks 
 
Note the expansion in the late sixties, the recession of the early seventies, the mid-
seventies and the very steep recession of the early eighties. There follows a complete 
recovery in the latter part of the eighties – which contrasts starkly with the behaviour 
of the Continental shocks – then the very shallow recession at the beginning of the 
nineties and, finally, the extraordinary performance in the late nineties.  
 19 
 
Country Z2 Country Z2 Country Z2 
Australia   0.0999 Germany -0.1296 Norway -0.0996 
Austria  -0.2088 Greece -0.2851 New Zeal. -0.1376 
Belgium  0.1231 Iceland -0.2312 Portugal  0.2901 
Canada  0.2096 Ireland  0.3113 Spain  0.0256 
Denmark  0.1851 Italy -0.1303 Sweden -0.2545 
Finland -0.1939 Japan -0.2255 UK  0.2212 
France -0.0223 Netherlands 0.295 US  0.4292 
 
Table 7. Eigenvector for second principal component; the “American shocks”. 
 
Countries with large negative weights are Greece, Iceland, Japan and Sweden. 
These countries shared negative experiences in the nineties; unemployment was on 
the rise. On the whole, this factor appears to capture the diverse experiences in the 
past ten to fifteen years, while some countries succeeded in reducing their structural 
unemployment rate, others were much less successful. 
The third Principal Component Z3 has large positive weights for Iceland, New 
Zealand and Norway and large negative weights for Belgium, Japan and Portugal. The 
first three countries had unemployment rise in the late eighties and only fall back 
toward the middle of the nineties. The latter three countries had exactly the opposite 
experience; unemployment fell in the late eighties and then rose again towards the 
mid-nineties. We call this the “Late-eighties shocks.” It is shown in Figure 5.  
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   Figure 5. The Late-eighties shocks 
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The final principal component Z4 shows a dramatic shock in the early nineties and 
then a full recovery dur ing the nineties to the low levels experienced in the mid-
eighties. This Principal Component explains 4% of the variation in matrix U, which 
brings the cumulative explanatory power of the first three Principal Components up to 
93%.  
 
Country Z3 Country Z3 Country Z3 
Australia  0.0397 Germany -0.1833 Norway 0.2100 
Austria  -0.0194 Greece -0.1030 New Zeal. 0.4100 
Belgium -0.2525 Iceland 0.3824 Portugal -0.3451 
Canada 0.1350 Ireland 0.2161 Spain -0.1065 
Denmark 0.1329 Italy -0.1527 Sweden 0.1299 
Finland 0.0974 Japan -0.4818 UK -0.0445 
France -0.1038 Netherlands -0.0468 US 0.1473 
 
Table 8. Eigenvector for the third principal component; the “Late-eighties shock”. 
 
This PC has very large positive weights for Finland, Iceland, Portugal and Sweden. 
Since three out of four countries are Scandinavian, we label the PC the “Scandinavian 
shocks.” 
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        Figure 6. The Scandinavian shocks 
 
This pattern corresponds well not just with measured unemployment in Iceland, 
Sweden and Finland, but also to the economic turbulence that hit those countries. 
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There is the recession in the late sixties and the early nineties recession. The spike 
after 1975, in contrast, appears to coincide with a rise in Portuguese unemployment. 
 
Country Z4 Country Z4 Country Z4 
Australia    0.0191 Germany -0.0517 Norway -0.2153 
Austria  -0.2049 Greece -0.3673 New Zealand -0.1351 
Belgium   0.0199 Iceland   0.3418 Portugal   0.4741 
Canada   0.0016 Ireland -0.2197 Spain -0.0569 
Denmark   0.0339 Italy -0.1217 Sweden   0.3969 
Finland   0.4247 Japan -0.0072 UK -0.0259 
France -0.0262 Netherlands -0.0821 US  0.0033 
 
Table 9. Eigenvector for the fourth principal component; the “Scandinavian shocks”. 
 
 We conclude that most of the OECD unemployment experience can, to a very 
large extent, be summarised by two constructed variables, one representing the 
Continental European experience and the other representing the US experience. There 
is also the rather unique Scandinavian pattern where the early nineties plaid a large 
role, this is our third constructed variable. These results provide an answer to the first 
of two key questions posed at the beginning of this paper; whether national 
unemployment rates only differ in their sensitivity to global shocks and if not, which 
national shocks are of importance. Our results point to the US experience as an 
example of an idiosyncratic development; speedy recoveries following the oil 
recessions and the booming nineties.  
 What remains is to address the second key question posed in Section I, whether 
unemployment dynamics can be better described as persistent effects of transitory 
shocks – hysteresis – or, alternatively, whether the shocks themselves happen to be 
persistent; national labour markets efficient but affected by persistent shocks.  
 
3.2 Persistence or hysteresis? 
We have seen that the first Principal Component Z1 – the Continental shocks – 
exhibits persistence of a particular kind. Figure 3 revealed two mean shifts; one 
occurred in the mid seventies and one at the beginning of the eighties. Apart from 
these two shifts, the series looked stationary. We will now use these Continental 
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shocks as a measure of the global shocks, 1G Z= , and consider to what extent this can 
account for the persistence of individual unemployment series.  
 To show the effect of different specifications of the model on the speed of 
adjustment we will report average equations, using the Swamy Random Coefficient 
Model. This estimates the model separately for each country and then forms weighted 
averages of the coefficients, the weights depending on the coefficient variances. For 
the simplest model where the natural rate is assumed to be a constant, the estimated 
equation is 
*
1 1( )it i i it i it itu u u ul d e- -D = - + D + .                                 (7’) 
The averages for the 19 countries where we have data on domestic institutions 
(Greece and Iceland excluded from our sample of 21 countries listed in Table 1) are 
 
Random coefficients model 
Variable  Coefficient (1) Standard error (2) (1)/(2) 
        Constant 0.39 0.10 3.93 
         1itu -  0.06 0.02 3.61 
         1itu -D  0.49 0.05 10.61 
 
Table 10. Weighted average estimates assuming a constant natural rate 
 
The average speed of adjustment is 6% a year. The test for equality of coefficients is 
not rejected at the 5% level and the fixed effect estimates which impose slope 
homogeneity are very similar, with a speed of adjustment of 6.9% a year.  
 We then add the first PC – the Continental shock – as our measure of global 
shocks and the average speed of adjustment rises to 22% a year. 
 
Random coefficients model 
Variable  Coefficient (1) Standard error (2) (1)/(2) 
        Constant 1.29 0.03 5.18 
         1itu -  0.22 0.04 6.30 
         1itu -D  0.45 0.05 10.04 
          tG  0.15 0.04 4.41 
 
Table 11. Weighted average estimates assuming a variable natural rate 
 
When slope homogeneity is imposed, which is rejected in this case, the speed of 
adjustment is lower at 15%. Coefficient heterogeneity can bias the adjustment 
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coefficient towards zero for reasons discussed in Pesaran and Smith (1995). But even 
so, allowing for the global shocks increases the measured speed of adjustment 
substantially.  
 
Least squares with group dummy variables 
Variable  Coefficient (1) Standard error (2) (1)/(2) 
         1itu -  0.15 0.01 10.79 
         1itu -D  0.49 0.03 16.14 
          tG  0.09 0.01 7.54 
R-squared = 0.32   
 
Table 12. Estimation of speed of adjustment with a variable natural rate and homogeneity 
 
We cannot estimate all the individual equations with domestic measures influencing 
the natural rate because some of the domestic measures do not vary over time for 
some countries. However, we can estimate the model imposing slope homogeneity. 
 
Least squares with group dummy variables 
     Variable Coefficient (1) Standard error (2) (1)/(2) 
         1itu -    0.17 0.02 11.55 
         1itu -D    0.48 0.03 15.56 
          tG    0.10 0.01 7.50 
  Replacement ratio   0.12 0.29 0.42 
  Duration -0.38 0.23 1.68 
  Coordination -0.18 0.09 1.98 
  Density   0.02     0.00(4) 3.47 
  Employment protection -0.04 0.12 0.37 
R-squared = 0.34  
 
Table 13. Estimation of speed of adjustment with a variable  natural rate with institutions 
included 
 
With these the speed of adjustment rises slightly from 15% to 17%. Many of the 
institutional variables are not significant, but this may be because they influence the 
impact of global shocks or the speed of adjustment. To allow for this we allow both of 
these to be influenced by the institutional variables. We do this by working with 
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deviations from country means; it it iu u u= -% , so that we just use the within country 
variation and use the model: 
 
1 1( ' )
'
'
it it it it t it it it
it it
it it
u D G u u
D
D
l q f d e
l l
f f
- -D = + - + D +
=
=
% % %
 
The vector itD includes a constant, coordination, employment protection, union 
density, duration of benefits and the replacement ratio. The variables are measured 
over the six periods specified above. Starting from a general model where all five 
institutional variables could influence responsiveness to global shocks, ,f  speed of 
convergence ,l  and the natural rate ,q  and dropping insignificant terms gave the 
final model. In this the speed of adjustment is a function of the coordination of wage 
bargains as well as employment protection, 
ititit empcoor 210 llll ++= .                                        (13) 
The natural rate u* is a function of the domestic variables coordination, employment 
protection and union density and the global influences captured by the first Principal 
Component: 
*
0 1 2 3it i it it it it tu u coor emp den Gq q q q f= + + + + +                          (14) 
Finally, the sensitivity of the national natural rate to global shocks is a function of 
employment protection and the duration of benefits: 
durempit 210 ffff ++=                                          (15) 
 
Nonlinear least squares with group dummy variables 
     Variable Coefficient (1) Standard error (2) (1)/(2) 
d  0.50 0.03 16.79 
l0  0.33 0.06 5.38 
l1              -0.04 0.03 1.41 
l2 -0.08 0.03 2.98 
q0  0.06 0.48 0.12 
q1 -0.64 0.31 2.04 
q2  0.81 0.36 2.27 
q3  0.02 0.01 1.77 
f0  0.25 0.09 2.75 
f1  0.22 0.08 2.94 
f2  0.25 0.11 2.22 
R-squared = 0.34  
 
Table 14. The interaction of shocks and institutions  
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The speed of adjustment l is a negative function of employment protection and the 
coordination of bargaining. The implied adjustment coefficients look sensible. They 
range from 7% to 29% with an average of 17%, larger than the usual estimates. In the 
US the adjustment rate is constant at 29%, the fastest, the coordination and 
employment measures do not change. France and Germany both start off the period 
with speeds of adjustment over 20%, these fall to 11.5% in Germany and 15% in 
France and then start to rise in the late 1980s in Germany, mid 1990s in France, 
ending at 14% for Germany, 17% for France. The natural rate u* is a negative 
function of coordination and a positive function of both union density and 
employment protection. Finally, the sensitivity f  of the domestic natural rate to global 
shocks – as measured by the first Principal Component – is a positive function of 
employment protection and the duration of unemployment benefits. We also tried 
adding the change in inflation, which had a negative though insignificant effect, t=-
1.86, so traditional demand shocks may not be as important as real global shocks. 
In sum: Employment protection causes greater unemployment persistence, high 
natural rates of unemployment and greater sensitivity to global shocks. Coordination, 
although increasing persistence, lowers the (natural) level of unemployment. Union 
density raises the natural rate of unemployment. Finally, the duration of benefits has a 
positive impact on the sensitivity of the natural rate to global shocks.  
 
4. Conclusions  
We have used unemployment data for twenty-one countries over the period 1960 to 
2003 to identify unobservable global shocks to unemployment using factor analysis. 
We find that the first two principal components can explain 84% of the variation in 
unemployment across countries and over time, while the first four can explain 93% of 
the variation. The first variable appears to capture the first- and the second oil price 
shocks, as well as the recession that hit many countries in the early nineties. In 
contrast, the second describes transient elevations of unemployment in the mid- and 
late seventies as well as the phenomenal performance of the US economy in the late 
nineties. The remaining two shocks appear to represent the monetary shocks affecting 
unemployment in other countries in the late eighties and the early nineties and the 
banking crises that hit Scandinavia in the early nineties.  
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We find that the first Principal Component accounts for much of the observed 
persistence in the national unemployment series; there is much less inherent 
persistence in these series once account is taken of this underlying variable. We also 
find that domestic labour market institutions influence the sensitivity to global shocks, 
the speed of convergence to equilibrium and the natural rate itself. Allowing for 
global shocks and time-varying parameters produces estimates of speeds of 
convergence that are much faster than those common in the literature.  
It follows that the key to resolving the unemployment puzzle lies in explaining the 
Continental shocks in the mid seventies and early eighties. A theory that explains why 
these shocks raised mean unemployment, while most other shocks left only a transient 
residue in the unemployment pool, is a candidate explanation. In contrast, theories 
that predict that all changes in unemployment are equally persistent – independent of 
the cause, size or duration of shocks – do not fit the data. We leave it to the reader to 
do the judging! 
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